Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel - Hegels Philosophy, The traditional metaphysical view of Hegels philosophy, The non-traditional or post-Kantian view of Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit

Made by Albu Rozalina

Group E36

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Along with J. G. Fichte and F. W. J. von ScheHegel (1770-1831) belongs to the period of "German idealism" in the decades foKant. The most systematic of the post-Kantian idealists, Hegel attempted, throughout his published writings as weas in his lectures, to elaborate a comprehensive and systematic ontology from a "logical" starting point. He is perhaps most wefor his teleological account of history, an account which was later taken over by Marx and "inverted" into a materialist theory of an historical development culminating in communism. For most of the twentieth century, the "logical" side of Hegel's thought had been largely forgotten, but his political and social philosophy continued to find interest and support. However, since the 1970s, a degree of more general philosophical interest in Hegel's systematic thought has also been revived. 581

1. Life, Work, and Influence 2. Hegel's Philosophy 2.1 The traditional "metaphysical" view 2.2 The non-traditional "post-Kantian" view 3. Hegel's Works 3.1 Phenomenology of Spirit 3.2 Science of Logic 3.3 Philosophy of Right

1. Life, Work, and Influence

Born in 1770 in Stuttgart, Hegel spent the years 1788-1793 as a theology student in nearby Tübingen, forming friendships there with festudents, the future great romantic poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) and Friedrich W. J. von Sche(1775-1854), who, like Hegel, would become one of the major figures of the German philosophical scene in the first half of the nineteenth century. These friendships clearly had a major influence on Hegel's philosophical development, and for a while the intelives of the three were closely intertwined. ud1

Agraduation Hegel worked as a tutor for families in Bern and then Frankfurt, where he was reunited with Hölderlin. Until around 1800, Hegel devoted himself to developing his ideas on religious and social themes, and seemed to have envisaged a future for himself as a type of modernising and reforming educator, in the image of figures of the German Enlightenment such as Lessing and SchiAround the turn of the century, however, possibly under the influence of Hölderlin, his interests turned more to the issues in the "critical" philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) that had enthused Hölderlin, Scheand many others, and in 1801 he moved to the University of Jena to join ScheIn the 1790s Jena had become a centre of both "Kantian" philosophy and the early romantic movement and by the time of Hegel's arrival Schehad already become an established figure, taking the approach of J. G. Fichte (the most important of the new Kantian-styled philosophers, in novel directions. In late 1801, Hegel published his first philosophical work, The Difference between Fichte's and ScheSystem of Philosophy, and up until 1803 worked closely with Schewith whom he edited the Critical Journal of Philosophy. In his "Difference" essay Hegel had argued that Scheapproach succeeded where Fichte's failed in the project of systematising and thereby completing Kant's transcendental idealism, and on the basis of this type of advocacy was dogged for many years by the reputation of being a "mere" foof Sche(who was five years his junior).

By late 1806 Hegel had completed his first major work, the Phenomenology of Spirit (published 1807), which showed a divergence from his earlier, seemingly more Scheapproach. Schewho had leJena in 1803, interpreted a barbed criticism in the Phenomenology's preface as aimed at him, and their friendship abruptly ended. The occupation of Jena by Napoleon's troops as Hegel was completing the manuscript closed the university and Hegel lethe town. Now without a university appointment he worked for a short time, apparently very successfuas an editor of a newspaper in Bamberg, and then from 1808-as the headmaster and philosophy teacher at a "gymnasium" in Nuremberg. During his time at Nuremberg he married and started a family, and wrote and published his Science of Logic. In 1816 he managed to return to his university career by being appointed to a chair in philosophy at the University of Heidelberg. Then in 1818, he was offered and took up the chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin, the most prestigious position in the German philosophical world. While in Heidelberg he published the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, a systematic work in which an abbreviated version of the earlier Science of Logic (the "Encyclopaedia Logic" or "Lesser Logic") was foby the application of its principles to the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. In 1821 in Berlin Hegel published his major work in political philosophy, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, based on lectures given at Heidelberg but ultimately grounded in the section of the Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit dealing with "objective spirit." During the foten years up to his death in 1831 Hegel enjcelebrity at Berlin, and published subsequent versions of the Encyclopaedia. Ahis death versions of his lectures on philosophy of history, philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and the history of philosophy were published.

AHegel's death, Schewhose reputation had long since been eclipsed by that of Hegel, was invited to take up the chair at Berlin, reputedly because the government of the day had wanted to counter the influence that Hegelian philosophy had developed among a generation of students. Since the early period of his cowith Hegel, Schehad become more religious in his philosophising and criticised the "rationalism" of Hegel's philosophy. During this time of Schetenure at Berlin, important forms of later critical reaction to Hegelian philosophy developed. Hegel himself had been a supporter of progressive but non-revolutionary politics, but his fodivided into "leand "right-wing" factions; from out of the former circle, Karl Marx was to develop his own "scientific" approach to society and history which appropriated many Hegelian ideas into Marx's materialistic outlook. (Later, especiain reaction to orthodSoviet versions of Marxism, many "Western Marxists" re-incorporated further Hegelian elements bainto their forms of Marxist philosophy.) Many of Scheown criticisms of Hegel's rationalism found their way into subsequent "existentialist" thought, especiavia the writings of Kierkegaard, who had attended Schelectures. Furthermore, the interpretation Scheoffered of Hegel during these years itself helped to shape subsequent generations' understanding of Hegel, contributing to the orthodor traditional understanding of Hegel as a "metaphysical" thinker in the pre-Kantian "dogmatic" sense.

In academic philosophy, Hegelian idealism underwent a revival in both Great Britain and the United States in the last decades of the nineteenth century. In Britain, where philosophers such as T. H Green and F. H. Bradley had developed metaphysical ideas which they related bato Hegel's thought, Hegel came to be one of the main targets of attaby the founders of the emerging "analytic" movement, Bertrand Russeand G. E. Moore. For most of the twentieth century, interest in Hegel became limited to the context of his relation to other more popular philosophical movements like existentialism or Marxism, or to his social and political thought. In France, a version of Hegelianism came to influence a generation of thinkers, including Jean-Paul Sartre and the psychoanalyst, JaLacan, largely through the lectures of Alexandre Kojève, an important precursor to the later "post-modern" movement. A later generation of French philosophers coming to prominence in the late 1960s and ahowever, tended to react against Hegel in ways analogous to those in which early analytic philosophers had reacted against the Hegel who had influenced their predecessors. In Germany, interest in Hegel was revived early in the century with the historical work of Wilhelm Dilthey, and important Hegelian elements were incorporated into the approach of thinkers of the Frankfurt School, such as Theodor Adorno, and later, Jürgen Habermas, as weas the "hermeneutic" approach of H.-G. Gadamer. In Hungary, similar Hegelian themes were developed by Georg Lukács and later thinkers of the "Budapest School." In the 1960s the German philosopher Klaus Hartmann developed what was termed a "non-metaphysical" interpretation of Hegel which, together with the work of Dieter Henrich and others, played an important role in the revival of interest in Hegel in academic philosophy in the second half of the century. Within English-speaking philosophy, the final quarter of the twentieth century saw something of a revival of serious interest in Hegel's philosophy, especiain North America, with important works appearing such as those by H. S. Harris, Charles Taylor, Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard.

2. Hegel's Philosophy

Hegel's own pithy account of the nature of philosophy given in the "Preface" to his Elements of the Philosophy of Right captures a characteristic tension in his philosophical approach and, in particular, in his approach to the nature and limits of human cognition. "Philosophy," he says there, "is its own time raised to the level of thought."

On the one hand we can clearly see in the phrase "its own time" the suggestion of an historical or cultural conditionedness and variability which applies even to the highest form of human cognition, philosophy itself -- the contents of philosophical knowledge, we might suspect, wicome from the historicachanging contents of contemporary culture. On the other, there is the hint of such contents being "raised" to some higher level, presumably higher than other levels of cognitive functioning -- those based in everyday perceptual experience, for example, or those characteristic of other areas of culture such as art and religion. This higher level takes the form of "thought" -- a type of cognition commonly taken as capable of having "eternal" contents (think of Plato and Frege, for example).

This antithetical combination within human cognition of the temporaand the eternal, a combination which reflects a broader conception of the human being as what Hegel describes elsewhere as a "finite-infinite," has led to Hegel being regarded in different ways by different types of philosophical readers. For example, an historicapragmatist like Richard Rorty, distrustful of aclaims or aspirations to the "God's-eye view," could praise Hegel as a philosopher who had introduced this historicareflective dimension into philosophy (and setting it on the characteristica"hermeneutic" path which has predominated in modern continental philosophy) but who had unfortunately stiremained bogged down in the remnants of the Platonistic idea of the search for ahistorical truths. Those adopting such an approach to Hegel tend to have in mind the (relatively) young author of the Phenomenology of Spirit and have tended to dismiss as "metaphysical" later and more systematic works like the Science of Logic. In contrast, the British Hegelian movement at the end of the nineteenth century, for example, tended to ignore the Phenomenology and the more historicist dimensions of his thought, and found in Hegel a systematic metaphysician whose Logic provided a systematic and definitive philosophical ontology of an idealist type. This latter traditional, "metaphysical" view of Hegel dominated Hegel reception for most of the twentieth century, but has over the last few decades been contested by many Hegel scholars who have offered an alternative, "post-Kantian" view of Hegel.

2.1 The traditional "metaphysical" view of Hegel's philosophy

Given the understanding of Hegel that predominated at the time of the birth of analytic philosophy together with the fact that early analytic philosophers were rebeprecisely against "Hegelianism" so understood, the "Hegel" encountered in discussions within analytic philosophy is othat of the late nineteenth-century interpretation. In this picture, Hegel is seen as offering a metaphysico-religious view of "Absolute Spirit" which draws on pantheistic ideas of the identity of the universe and God, together with theistic ideas concerning the necessary "self-consciousness" of God. The peculiarity of Hegel's view, on this account, lies in his idea that the mind of God becomes actual only via the minds of his creatures, who serve as its vehicle. It is as distributed bearers of this developing self-consciousness of God that those finitely-embodied inhabitants of the universe -- we humans -- can be such "finite-infinites."

An important consequence of Hegel's metaphysics, so understood, concerns history and the idea of historical development or progress, and it is as an advocate of an idea concerning the logicateleological course of history that Hegel is most odecried. To many critics Hegel not only was an advocate of a disastrous political conception of the state and the relation of its citizens to it, a conception prefiguring twentieth-century totalitarianism, but had tried to underpin such advocacy with dubious logico-metaphysical speculations. With his idea of the development of "spirit" in history, Hegel is seen as literalising a way of talking about different cultures in terms of their "spirits," of constructing a developmental sequence of epochs typical of nineteenth-century ideas of linear historical progress, and then enveloping this story of human progress in terms of one about the developing self-conscious of the cosmos-God itself.

As the bottom line of such an account concerned the evolution of states of a mind (God's), such an account is clearly an idealist one, but not in the sense, say, of Berkeley. The pantheistic legacy inherited by Hegel meant that he had no problem in considering an objective outer world beyond any particular subjective mind. But this objective world itself had to be understood as conceptuainformed, as it were -- it was objectified spirit. Thus in contrast to Berkeleian "subjective idealism" it became common to talk of Hegel as incorporating the "objective idealism" of views, especiacommon among German historians, in which social life and thought were understood in terms of the conceptual or "spiritual" structures that informed them. But in contrast to both forms of idealism, Hegel, according to this reading, postulated a form of absolute idealism by including both subjective life and the objective cultural practices on which subjective life depended within the dynamics of the development of the self-consciousness and self-actualisation of God, the "Absolute Spirit."

It is hardly surprising, given the more secular character of much twentieth-century philosophy, that Hegel, so understood, would be generaregarded as of merely historical interest. Nevertheless, Hegel was stiseen by many as an important precursor of other more characteristicamodern strands of thought such as existentialism and Marxist materialism. Existentialists were thought of as taking the idea of the finitude and historical and cultural dependence of individual subjects from Hegel and leaving out apretensions to the "absolute," while Marxists were thought of as taking the historical dynamics of the Hegelian picture but understanding this in materialist rather than idealist categories. But while the traditional view of Hegel remained a commonplace throughout the twentieth century it has come to be increasingly questioned as an accurate account of Hegel's philosophy within Hegel scholarship itself. In the last quarter of the century, an increasing number of Hegel interpreters argued that such an understanding was seriously flawed, and while various quite different philosophical interpretations of Hegel have emerged which attempt to ahim of implausible metaphysico-theological views, one common tendency has been to stress the continuity of his ideas with the "critical philosophy" of Immanuel Kant.

2.2 The non-traditional or "post-Kantian" view of Hegel

Least controversiait has been claimed that either particular works such as the Phenomenology of Spirit, or particular areas of Hegel's philosophy, especiahis ethical and political philosophy, can be understood as standing independently of the type of unacceptable metaphysical system sketched above. Somewhat more controversiait has also been argued that the traditional picture is simply wrong at a more general "metaphysical" level and that Hegel is in no way committed to the bizarre "spirit monism" that has been traditionaattributed to him. While these latter views odiffer among themselves and continue to take exception to various aspects of Hegel's actual work, they commonly agree in regarding Hegel as being a "post-Kantian" philosopher who had accepted that aspect of Kant's critical philosophy which has been the most influential, his critique of traditional "dogmatic" metaphysics. Thus while the traditional view sees Hegel as exemplifying the very type of metaphysical speculation that Kant successfucriticised, the post-Kantian view of Hegel sees him as both accepting and extending Kant's critique, even of turning it against the residual "dogmaticametaphysical" aspects of Kant's own philosophy.

To see Hegel as a post-Kantian is to regard him as extending that "critical" turn that Kant saw as setting his philosophy on a scientific footing in a way analogous to the work of Copernicus in cosmology. With his Copernican analogy Kant had compared the way that the positions of the sun and earth were reversed in Copernicus' transformation of cosmology to the way that the positions of knowing subject and known object were reversed in his own transcendental idealism. Objectivity could no longer be thought as a matter of mental representations "corresponding" to an object "in itself" . Having posed the question of the ground of the relation of a representation to an object, Kant had answered that where a representation was not made possible by the process of sensory affection, it could be justified as objective only if through it it became possible to cognise something as an object.

No sooner had Kant's philosophy appeared then many objections were raised, among which were complaints about the apparently irreducible gap between the mind qua universal discursive inteand the mind as individual psychological reality. Kantian ideas were quiintegrated by Schewith extant Spinozist ideas concerning mind and body as different aspects of an underlying substance to yield a type of philosophical biology. Others, such as Wilhelm von Humboldt and Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher joined Kantian ideas about the mind with philological ideas linking thought to the structures of historicavariable languages. Other critics pointed to internal inconsistencies in Kant's picture in which the world in itself seemed to be thought of on the one hand as the cause of its appearance, and on the other, as beyond knowledge and its constituent categories such as "cause." Among the ambitions of many of Kant's successors, including Hegel, was that of somehow "completing" Kant. In Hegel especiamany argue, one can see the ambition to bring together the universalist dimensions of Kant's transcendental program with the culturaparticularist conceptions of his more historicaand relativisticacontemporaries. This resulted in his controversial conception of "spirit," as developed in his Phenomenology of Spirit. With this notion, it has been argued, Hegel was pursing the Kantian question of the conditions of rational human "mindedness" rather than being concerned with giving an account of the developing self-consciousness of God. But while Kant had limited such conditions to "formal" structures of the mind, Hegel extended them to include aspects of historicaand sociadetermined forms of embodied existence.

3. Hegel's Works

3.1 Phenomenology of Spirit

The term "phenomenology" had been coined by the German scientist and mathematician (and Kant correspondent) J. H. Lambert (1728 -- 1777), and in a letter to Lambert, sent to accompany a copy of his "Inaugural Dissertation" (1770), Kant had proposed a "general phenomenology" as a necessary "propaedeutic" presupposed by the science of metaphysics. Such a phenomenology was meant to determine the "validity and limitations" of what he cathe "principles of sensibility," principles he had (he thought) shown in the accompanying work to be importantly different to those of conceptual thought. The term clearly suited Kant as he had distinguished the "phenomena" known through the faculty of sensibility from the "noumena" known conceptuaThis envisioned "phenomenology" seems to coincide roughly with what he was to eventuaentitle a "critique of pure reason," although Kant's thought had gone through important changes by the time that he came to publish the work of that name (1781, second edition 1787). Perhaps because of this he never again used the term "phenomenology" for quite this purpose.

There is clearly some continuity between this Kantian notion and Hegel's project. In a sense Hegel's phenomenology is a study of "phenomena" (although this is not a realm he would contrast with that of "noumena" ) and Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is likewise to be regarded as a type of "propaedeutic" to philosophy rather than an exercise in it -- a type of induction or education of the reader to the "standpoint" of purely conceptual thought of philosophy itself. As such, its structure has been compared to that of an "educational novel," having an abstractly conceived protagonist -- the bearer of an evolving series of "shapes of consciousness" or the inhabitant of a series of successive phenomenal worlds -- whose progress and set-bathe reader foand learns from. Or at least this is how the work sets out: in the later sections the earlier series of "shapes of consciousness" becomes replaced with what seem more like configurations of human social existence, and the work comes to look more like an account of interlinked forms of social existence and thought, the series of which maps onto the history of western European civilization from the Greeks to Hegel's own time. The fact that it ends in the attainment of "Absolute Knowing," the standpoint from which real philosophy gets done, seems to support the traditionalist reading in which a "triumphalist" narrative of the growth of western civilization is combined with the theological interpretation of God's self-manifestation and self-comprehension. When Kant had broached the idea of a phenomenological propaedeutic to Lambert, he himself had stibelieved in the project of a purely conceptual metaphysics, but this was a project that in his later critical philosophy he came to disavow. Traditional readers of Hegel thus see the Phenomenology's telos as attesting to Hegel's "pre-Kantian" (that is, "pre-critical") outlook and his embrace of the metaphysical project that Kant famously came to dismiss as iSupporters of the non-metaphysical Hegel obviously interpret this work and its telos differently. For example, some have argued that what this history trais the development of a type of social existence which enables a unique form of rationality, in that in such a society adogmatic bases of thought have been graduareplaced by a system in which aclaims become open to rational self-correction, by becoming exposed to demands for conceptuajustifications.

Something of Hegel's phenomenological method may be conveyed by the first few chapters, which are perhaps among the more conventionaphilosophical parts. Chapters 1 to 3 effectively foa developmental series of "shapes of consciousness" or conscious attitudes which seem to be based upon distinct criteria for epistemic certainty. Chapter 1, "Sense-certainty" considers an epistemological attitude involving an appeal to some immediately given perceptual contents -- the sort of role played by "sense data" in some early twentieth-century approaches to epistemology, for example. By fothe protagonist's attempts to make these implicit criteria explicit we are meant to appreciate that any such contents, even the apparently most "immediate," in fact contain implicit conceptuaarticulated presuppositions, and so, in Hegel's terminology, are "mediated." One might compare Hegel's point here to that expressed by Kant in his weknown claim that without concepts, those singular and immediate mental representations he ca"intuitions" are "blind." In more recent terminology one might talk of the "concept-" or "theory-ladenness" of aexperience, and the lessons of this chapter have been likened to that of Wilfrid Sefamous criticism of the "myth of the given."

By the end of this chapter our protagonist consciousness (and by implication, we the audience to this drama) has learnt that the nature of consciousness cannot be as originathought, rather its contents must have some implicit universal (conceptual) aspect to them. Consciousness thus now commences anew with its new implicit epistemic criterion -- the assumption that since the contents of consciousness are "universal" they must be publicly graspable by others as weHegel's name for this type of perceptual realism in which any individual's idiosyncratic private apprehension wialways be in principle correctable by the experience of others is "perception" (Wahrnehmung -- in German this term having the connotations of taking (nehmen) to be true (wahr)). As with the case for "sense-certainty," here again, by fothe protagonist consciousness's efforts to make this implicit criterion explicit, we see how the criterion generates contradictions which eventuaundermine it as a criterion for certainty. In fact, such cointo a type of self-generated scepticism is typical of athe "shapes" we foin the work, and there seems something inherently skeptical about such reflexive cognitive processes. But Hegel's point is equathat there has always been something positive that has been learned in such processes, and this learning is more than that which consists in the mere elimination of epistemological dead-ends. Rather, as in the way that the internal contradictions that emerged from sense-certainty had generated a new shape, perception, the coof any given attitude always involves the emergence of some new implicit criterion which wibe the basis of a new emergent attitude. In the case of "perception," the emergent new shape of consciousness Hegel ca"understanding" -- a shape which he identifies with scientific cognition rather than that of everyday "perception."

The transition from Chapter 3 to 4, "The Truth of Self-Certainty," also marks a more general transition from "consciousness" to "self-consciousness." It is in the course of chapter 4 that we find what is perhaps the most wepart of the Phenomenology, the account of the "struggle of recognition" in which Hegel examines the intersubjective conditions which he sees as necessary for any form of "consciousness".

Like Kant, Hegel thinks that one's capacity to be "conscious" of some external object as something distinct from oneself requires the reflexivity of "self-consciousness," that is, it requires one's awareness of oneself as a subject for whom something distinct, the object, is presented as known. Hegel goes beyond Kant, however, in making this requirement dependent on one's recognition (or a-- Anerkennung) as a subject by other self-consciousnesses whom one recognises in turn. In short, one's self-consciousness is in no sense direct, as it was for Descartes, for example. It comes about only indirectly via one's recognising other conscious subjects' recognition of oneself! It is in this way that the Phenomenology can change course, the earlier traof "shapes of consciousness" being effectively replaced by the traof distinct patterns of "mutual recognition" between subjects.

It is thus that Hegel has effected the transition from a phenomenology of "subjective mind," as it were, to one of "objective spirit," thought of as culturadistinct patterns of social interaction analysed in terms of the patterns of reciprocal recognition they embody. ("Geist" can be translated as either "mind" or "spirit," but the latter, aa more cultural sense, as in the phrase "spirit of the age" ("Zeitgeist" ), seems a more suitable rendering for the title.) But this is only worked out in the text graduaWe -- the reading, "phenomenological" we -- can see how particular shapes of self-consciousness, such as that of the other-worldly religious self-consciousness ("unhappy consciousness" ) with which chapter 4 ends, depend on certain institutionalised forms of mutual recognition. But we are seeing this from the "outside" as it were, we stihave to learn how real in situ self-consciousnesses could learn this of themselves. So we have to see how the protagonist self-consciousness could achieve this insight. It is to this end that we further trace the learning path of self-consciousness through the processes of "reason" (in chapter 5) before "objective spirit" can become the explicit subject matter of chapter 6, (Spirit).

Hegel's discussion of spirit starts from what he ca"Sittlichkeit" (translated as "ethical order" or "ethical substance"), "Sittlichkeit" being a nominalisation from the adjectival (or adverbial) form "sittlich," "customary," from the stem "Sitte" -- "custom" or "convention." Thus Hegel might be seen as adopting the viewpoint that since social life is ordered by customs we can approach the lives of those living in it in terms of the patterns of those customs or conventions themselves -- the conventional practices, as it were, constituting specific forms of life. It is not surprising then that his account of spirit here starts with a discussion of religious and civic law. Undoubtedly it is Hegel's tendency to nominalise such abstract concepts as "customary" in his attempt to capture the concrete nature of such as patterns of conventional life, together with the tendency to then personify them (as in talking about "spirit" becoming "self-conscious") that lends plausibility to the traditionalist understanding of Hegel. But for non-traditionalists it is not obvious that Hegel is in any way committed to any metaphysical supra-individual conscious beings with such usages. To take an example, in the second section of the chapter "Spirit" Hegel discusses "culture" as the "world of self-alienated spirit." The idea seems to be that humans in society not only interact, but that they cocreate relatively enduring cultural products (stories, dramas, and so forth) within which they can recognise their own patterns of life reflected. We might find intethe idea that such products "hold up a mirror to society" within which "the society can regard itself," without thinking we are thereby committed to some supra-individual social "mind" achieving self-consciousness. Furthermore, such cultural products themselves provide conditions aindividuals to adopt particular cognitive attitudes. Thus, for example, the capacity to adopt the type of objective viewpoint demanded by Kantian morality (discussed in the final section of Spirit) -- the capacity to see things, as it were, from a "universal" point of view -- is bound up with the attitude implicitly adopted in engaging with spirit's "alienations."

We might think that if Kant had written the Phenomenology, he would have ended it at chapter 6 with the modern moral subject as the telos of the story. For Kant, the practical knowledge of morality, orienting one within the noumenal world, exceeds the scope of theoretical knowledge which had been limited to phenomena. Hegel, however, thought that philosophy had to unify theoretical and practical knowledge, and so the Phenomenology has further to go. Again, this is seen differently by traditionalists and revisionists. For traditionalist